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Distorted cognition related to male sexual offending: 
The multi-mechanism theory of cognitive distortions (MMT-CD)
Abstract
Cognitive distortions are considered an important factor in the etiology and maintenance of sexual offending behavior in males. A predominant view within the literature is that cognitive distortions are cognitive products that arise from deeper cognitive structures, although it has also been proposed that goals and situational factors can play a role. In this article, we provide an updated theoretical account of cognitive distortions in males – the Multi-Mechanism Theory of Cognitive Distortions (MMT-CD). Adopting a dual-process perspective, and incorporating the concept of motivated cognition and the effects of visceral factors, we propose that cognitive distortions arise from three mechanisms, which can be identified in terms of their temporal occurrence to an offence. Mechanism I accounts for cognitive distortions that arise long before an offense is committed but serve to influence an individual’s life-course and goals in a way that brings them closer eventually sexually offending. Mechanism II accounts for distortions that arise in the lead up to or immediately before a sexual offense, thus, providing a justification for committing an offense. Mechanism III accounts for distortions that are formed post-offense as a result of the adversarial context of the individual’s social environment. We describe: (1) the nature of the each mechanism; (2) the way they underpin particular distortions; (3) the role they play in the etiology of sex offending; (4) and how they may play out in research and practice.






Beck (1963) was the first to coin the term cognitive distortions to describe the systematic erroneous thinking patterns of depressed individuals. Beck proposed that these inaccurate thoughts elicit, reinforce, and maintain the negative emotions that the individual experiences about themselves and the world. Researchers and clinicians have similarly noted distorted, and in many cases, offense-supportive thinking patterns in many sex offenders. Abel, Becker, and Cunningham-Rathner (1984) applied the term ‘cognitive distortions’ to describe these particular distorted cognitions. However, in more recent years, the utility of ‘cognitive distortions’ has been criticized for its lack of definitional clarity (Maruna & Mann, 2006). This has led to debates regarding its relevance as a target in sex offender treatment (Marshall, Marshall, & Kingston, 2011; Ó Ciardha & Gannon, 2011) and its theoretical understanding (Ó Ciardha & Ward, 2013). Acknowledging these issues, Ó Ciardha and Ward (2013) recently offered a working definition: “Cognitive distortions in sex offenders are specific or general beliefs/attitudes that violate commonly accepted norms of rationality, and which have been shown to be associated with the onset and maintenance of sexual offending” (p. 6). 
In the present paper, we bring together the different and often contradictory conceptualizations of cognitive distortions into an integrated theoretical framework. Specifically, we first review existing cognitive distortion theories, identifying their most useful aspects. Synthesizing these aspects with relevant theoretical insights from the wider psychological literature on human cognition, we go on to propose an updated theoretical account for understanding male sex offenders’ cognition. Adopting a dual-process perspective and incorporating the effect of motivational/situational factors, this theory highlights three distinct but interlinked mechanisms. We offer a description of: (1) the nature of the each mechanism; (2) the way they underpin particular distortions; (3) the role they play in the etiology of sexual offending; (4) how they can be incorporated into an existing multifactor theory of sexual offending; and (5) the research and practical implications that these mechanisms offer. 
Before continuing, there are two important points to note about the proposed theory. First, the existing theories and studies of cognitive distortions that are drawn upon refer to adult males. Thus, the proposed theory is specific to only this population. Second, some integrated theories of sexual offending explicitly state that distorted cognition is not pertinent to all sex offenses (Hall, & Hirschman, 1992; Ward & Siegert, 2002). As such, the proposed theory cannot be applied to the etiology of every sexual offense.

2. Explanations of cognitive distortions
In the following section, we briefly outline and critique the predominant cognitive distortion theories from the past 30 years. 

2.1. Abel and colleagues’ account 
Abel, Becker, and Cunningham-Rathner (1984) proposed that cognitive distortions are caused by an altered belief system that is supportive of offending behavior. This change in one’s beliefs serves to alleviate the tension (i.e., cognitive dissonance) caused by the discrepancy between an offense-related sexual interest and one’s cultural/social norms. Although not explicitly stated by Abel et al. (1984), it can be argued that this account positions cognitive distortions as having an etiological role in sexual offending. However, Abel et al. (1989) later added that cognitive distortions are minimizations and justifications that help sex offenders rationalize their ongoing offending behavior (protecting them from experiencing shame, guilt, and loss of self-esteem that would result from engaging in behaviors that are at odds with society’s norms). Given the reference to ongoing behavior, Abel and colleagues appear to view cognitive distortions as having a peri- and post-offense function, facilitating the cause and maintenance of offending behavior, respectively. 
The cognitive distortions that are verbalized post-offense are akin to the construct of denial. For example, Salter (1998) described four types of dissembling: 1) denial of behaviors; 2) denial of the seriousness of the behaviors in question; 3) denial of responsibility; and 4) admissions (but with justification). Indeed, Salter’s (1998) conceptualization of denial largely overlaps with other constructs that have been labeled as cognitive distortions, such as excuses (Pollock & Hashmall, 1991), defensiveness (Rogers & Dickey, 1991), rationalizations (Neidigh & Krop, 1992), and minimizations (Bumby, 1996). These labels suggest that clinicians tend to see explanations of offending as being distortions when a sex offender does not behave in a way that the professional thinks he should. However, as noted by Maruna and Mann (2006), denial and excuse-making likely serves a self-serving function in post-offense circumstance (e.g., maintaining self-esteem). Moreover, denying and minimizing one’s specific offending behavior may be different in kind from more general offence-supportive beliefs. Indeed, Nunes and Jung (2013) found that, although related, cognitive distortions (i.e., general distorted beliefs) and denial/minimization about offenders’ own offending behavior are distinct constructs. Thus, regarding the etiology and treatment of sexual offending, general distorted beliefs have been positioned as more important (Maruna & Mann, 2006; Ó Ciardha & Gannon, 2011) and have formed the basis of subsequent cognitive distortion theories (see below).
Abel and colleagues’ theory was highly innovative at the time of its development and forged a new area of sex offender research and practice. However, due to the lack of clarity, the theory suffers from problems with empirical adequacy. That is, due to the simplistic view of human cognition (Ward, Beech, & Polaschek, 2002) and the limited consideration of factors that impact it, the theory provided only a small range of testable hypothesis. The most important hypothesis was that sexual offenders against children (SOCs) present substantially more distortions than non-SOC comparison groups. which This has been only partially supported, as in some studies, the differences were significant but relatively small (e.g., Bumby, 1996; Marshall, Hamilton, & Fernandez, 2001; Tierney & McCabe, 2001). Nevertheless, it should be noted that many early studies on cognitive distortions were inspired by Abel and colleagues’ ideas.

2.2. Ward’s (2000) implicit theory account
Drawing upon the work of Haaga (1997), Ward, Hudson, Johnston, and Marshall (1997) described cognitive distortions as surface-level cognitive products (i.e., conscious outputs) that originate from deeper cognitive structures (i.e., implicit theories) via biased cognitive processing (i.e., faulty interpretations of social cues). Formed in childhood, implicit theories (ITs) are defined as core beliefs about the world, self, and others (Ward, 2000). They are similar to scientific theories, in that, they are used to explain, predict, and interpret interpersonal phenomena. Due to their implicit nature, ITs are difficult to consciously articulate. Instead, they can be inferred from one’s interpretation of social information and subsequent behavior (Ward, 2000). 
For sex offenders, these interpretations can pertain to the nature of the world (underpinned by general-level ITs); categories of people, such as women or children (underpinned by the middle-level ITs); or certain objects/people, including oneself (underpinned by specific-level ITs). Based on the existing literature, general-level ITs are shared across sex offenders (e.g., Dangerous World), while middle-level ITs tend to be associated with particular forms of offending behavior (e.g., distorted beliefs about Women as Sex Objects are typically held by rapists). Specific-level ITs can be either shared across sex offender types (e.g., Entitlement) or be offense-specific (e.g., Self as Collector in ‘child sexual exploitation material’ [CSEM] offenders). 
(1)	Beliefs about the world: SOCs and sex offenders against women are proposed to 
hold a Dangerous world IT, whereby the world is perceived as an inherently dangerous place. This can manifest in two ways for SOCs; (1) viewing children as less threatening partners than adults, or (2) believing that it is necessary to fight back and dominate others, including children (Ward & Keenan, 1999). In rapists and sexual murderers, it can take the form of a generalized hostility toward others (Polaschek & Ward, 2002; Beech, Fisher, & Ward, 2005). CSEM offenders are proposed to hold an Unhappy World IT, whereby the world is viewed as depressing and lonely, leading to isolation and feelings of emotional loneliness.
 
(2)	Offense-specific beliefs: Certain ITs relate to particular offender types. For 
example, SOCs are thought to hold a Children as sexual beings IT, which leads to the belief that children desire sex with adults and are able to make informed decisions about sexual behavior. Related to this is the Nature of Harm IT, which leads to the view that sexual activity with children is not harmful. Rapists and sexual murderers of women are proposed to hold a Women as sex objects IT, which generates beliefs that women constantly desire sex, even if it is coerced or violently attained. They are also thought to hold the Women are Dangerous IT, which generates beliefs that women are inherently deceitful and vindictive.

(3)	Beliefs about the self: These ITs primarily relate to entitlement and control. The 
Entitlement IT has been proposed for both SOCs and sex offenders against women. This IT generates beliefs that one is permitted to do what they want, due to being superior to others. Regarding control, SOCs are proposed to hold an Uncontrollability IT, believing their behavior to be governed by external forces, while rapists hold the Male sex drive is uncontrollable IT. Bartels and Merdian (2016) proposed that CSEM offenders hold a Self as Uncontrollable IT, where they view their offending behavior as being internally controlled but stable and unchangeable. As a result, they perceive themselves as addicted to viewing CSEM. They also argued that CSEM offenders hold a Self as Collector IT, believing their collecting behavior helps increase their self- and social-esteem. 
Among cognitive distortion theories, the IT account has received the most empirical attention. For example, interview studies have been conducted with SOCs (Marziano, Ward, Beech, & Pattison, 2006), rapists (Beech, Ward, & Fisher, 2006; Polaschek & Gannon, 2004), and sexual murderers of adult women (Beech et al., 2005), each finding evidence of the proposed ITs. However, these studies involve thematically grouping surface-level verbalizations. Thus, while the themes may align with proposed ITs, it is not possible to know whether they actually emerged from ITs. 
A small number of questionnaire-based studies have also been conducted. For example, using the MOLEST scale (Bumby, 1996), Keown, Gannon, and Ward (2010) found that SOCs endorsed items related to Children as sexual beings, Nature of Harm, and Uncontrollability to a greater level than non-sex offenders. However, the difference was due to SOCs disagreeing to a lesser extent with these items, as opposed to greater agreement. This may have been due to social desirable responding, a discrepancy between the SOCs’ implicit and explicit beliefs, or a lack of insight regarding their ITs. This highlights the issue of using self-report measures to tap deeper cognitive structures (Beech, Bartels, & Dixon, 2013). In addition, Howitt and Sheldon (2007) attempted to create an SOC-specific IT questionnaire, which failed to produce a factor structure coherent with Ward and Keenan’s (1999) IT account. In light of these issues, various types of indirect measures have been adapted to detect ITs, including the Implicit Association Test (Mihailides, Devilly, & Ward, 2004), Lexical Decision Task (Keown, Gannon, & Ward, 2008), Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (Dawson et al., 2009), and a modified Rapid Serial Visual Presentation task (Keown et al., 2010). These studies have provided some evidence that SOCs hold cognitive structures consistent with the IT account. However, the results are limited and often inconsistent (Ó Ciardha & Ward, 2013). Collectively, while there is some support for the various proposed IT in sex offenders, not all lines of research appear to converge. 

2.3 Mann and Beech’s (2003) schema-model
Within social cognition, schemas are defined as knowledge structures comprised of a network of learned associations (Bem, 1981) that guides attention, informs perceptions, and saves mental energy by providing shortcuts to the interpretation of incoming stimuli (Mann & Beech, 2003). The processes that give rise to such capabilities are said to occur automatically, such that, when a certain stimulus is encountered, it automatically activates (or primes) a particular association in one’s cognitive network (schema). The activation of a schematic association leads to an automatic reaction that provides the basis for people’s conscious beliefs (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Within cognitive therapy, schemas are defined as “cognitive structures used for screening, encoding and evaluating impinging stimuli” (Beck, 1964, p. 562). The ‘structure’ described here is broader than that offered within social cognition as it contain attitudes, memories, and core beliefs about the self and the world, as well as ‘if-then’ assumptions (Mann & Beech, 2003). However, like within the social cognition domain, therapy-related schemas are seen as being largely implicit as, according to Beck (1967), they need to be inferred (e.g., from free associations, verbalizations of experiences, tests designed to pinpoint stereotyped views of oneself and the world, and answers to direct questioning). 
Drawing upon both views of schemas (but particularly that related to schema therapy), Mann and Beech (2003) proposed a schema-based model of sexual offending. Similar to the IT account, they argued that cognitive distortions arise from faulty interpretations of reality caused by dysfunctional schemas interacting with life events. Mann and Beech proposed two types of schema; category and belief schemas. Category schemas relate to types of people and are akin to stereotypes. For example, rapists may hold particularly strong hostile category schemas about women (relative to other men), while SOCs may hold category schemas about children’s sexual agency. Belief schemas refer to assumptions about the self and the world. For example, a sex offender may hold a belief schema about power (e.g., ‘I must be in control of others, or they will hurt me’), which, in certain contexts (e.g., when facing a threatening situation) may activate a cluster of thoughts, emotions, and behaviors (i.e., a schema mode) that influences the individual to take control of the situation or others.
The research relating to child-related and women-related ITs (as described earlier) can be seen as supporting category schemas about children in SOCs and women in rapists. Also, from a qualitative analysis of an autobiographical task designed to identify schemas, Milner and Webster (2005) found that, relative SOCs and violent offenders, rapists evidenced a stronger Hostility/distrust of women schema (a category schema). Rapists also showed a stronger Sexual Entitlement schema than the two other groups (arguably a belief schema). As Ó Ciardha and Ward (2013) note, these bear a similarity to rape-related ITs (i.e., Women are Dangerous and Entitlement ITs, respectively). SOCs were also found to evidence stronger Worthlessness schema (a belief schema) relative to rapists and violent offenders.
Subsequent work by Mann (i.e., Mann & Hollin; 2007; Mann & Hollin, 2010) provides further support for belief schemas. Mann and Hollin (2007) content analyzed offending explanations offered by SOCs and rapists. Two particular themes that emerged, particularly in the rapists, were construed as schemas; namely, grievance and need for respect/control. Using a questionnaire designed to assess “general belief statements about the self, life, or other people”, Mann and Hollin (2010) found that, relative to non-offenders, SOCs, rapists, and violent offenders all scored significantly higher on the ‘disadvantaged’ theme (i.e., “beliefs that one has been damaged by others and controlled in the past”; p. 838). The authors noted that this theme reflects the Dangerous World IT. This IT is associated with SOCs and rapists, as well as violent offenders (in the form of the Beat or Be Beaten IT; Polaschek, Calvert, & Gannon, 2009), which may account for why the ‘disadvantaged’ theme did not discriminate between different sex offender types in Mann and Hollin’s (2010) study.
	 Sexual self-schemas (i.e., views about the sexual aspects of oneself) arguably represent a belief schema. Sigre-Leirós, Carvalho, and Nobre (2016) found that rapists were more likely to hold a ‘powerful-aggressive’ sexual self-schema (comprising a view of oneself as powerful, aggressive, and independent), relative to pedophilic and non-pedophilic SOCs. The authors noted that this was consistent with other ITs/schemas related to rape (e.g., Entitlement IT). ‘Early maladaptive schemas’ (EMSs) can also be construed as a type of belief schema as they are defined as broad, dysfunctional patterns of relating to oneself and others that develop as a result of adverse early experiences (Young et al., 2003). EMSs have been found to be associated with sexual offending in sexually aggressive college males (Sigre-Leirós, Carvalho, & Nobre, 2013) and convicted sex offenders (Chakhssi, Ruiter, & Bernstein, 2013). While SOCs are characterized by a wider range of EMSs compared to rapists (Carvalho & Nobre, 2014), pedophilic and non-pedophilic SOCs appear to show different patterns of EMSs (Sigre-Leirós, Carvalho, & Nobre, 2015a). Also, Sigre-Leirós, Carvalho, and Nobre (2015b) found that, in rapists, the entitlement/grandiosity EMS significantly predicted cognitive distortions that justify rape. This particular finding provides support for one of the central tenets of Mann and Beech’s model; that underlying belief schemas give rise to cognitive distortions in sex offenders. 
The above findings related to belief schemas suggests a need to address on general distorted cognitions in research and practice; not just offence-specific (category) cognitions. One issue with the above research is that it all relied upon self-report data. Given that schemas are deeper, more implicit constructs, the findings suffer from issues associated with using self-report (i.e., faking, lack of insight). Thus, employing indirect measures to the assessment of schemas may be a useful approach in future research. 

2.4. Ward, Gannon, and Keown’s (2016) Judgment Model of Cognitive Distortions 
In the Judgment Model of Cognitive Distortions (JMCD), Ward et al. (2006) proposed that offenders’ surface-level cognitive distortions are judgments about an aspect of the world that stem from a ‘thematic network’ comprised of beliefs, values, and actions. Thus, according to the JMCD, not only do cognitive distortions emerge from an offenders’ underlying implicit theories (belief-based judgments) but also from what an offender evaluates as being valuable or not (value-based judgments) and how they decide (and/or explain) their actions (action-based judgments). In the JMCD, belief-based judgments are explained on the basis of Ward’s (2000) IT theory. Value-based judgments, however, are proposed to be the result of faulty decisions being made to acquire a specific value. Ward et al. (2006) argued that these values correspond to the ‘primary goods’ laid out in the Good Lives Model of offender rehabilitation (Ward & Stewart, 2003), which include life (physical satisfaction and health), relatedness (i.e., need for intimacy), excellence in agency, excellence in work and play (including mastery), inner peace, creativity, happiness, community, and spirituality. Therefore, according to the JMCD, an individual may make the ‘bad’ decision to engage in inappropriate sexual activity with a child in order to achieve the value (or good) of intimacy (even in the absence of any ITs associated with child sexual abuse). When this bad decision is self-reported, it will appear like a stable cognitive distortion, despite having emerged situationally. Finally, action-based judgments are thought to arise when an individual is faced with the social implications of their offending behavior, such that they try and explain their behavior in a face-saving manner. Thus, action-based judgments account for the post-offence denials, minimizations, and justifications that can surface in the absence of distorted cognitive structures. 
In our view, the JMCD is currently the most comprehensive and useful cognitive distortion theory as it unified much of the cognitive distortion literature at the time. That is, it accounted for: (1) distorted cognitions emerging pre-offense, which may have an etiological function in sex offending; (2) cognitive distortions that emerge situationally in the absence of underlying distorted cognitive structures; and (3) post-offense denial, minimizations, and justifications that are often referred to as cognitive distortions (which may or may not emerge in the absence of underlying cognitive structures). As such, it helped to account for the often contradictory findings found in the literature (e.g., the failed attempts to identify ITs using indirect measures). In spite of this, there is a lack of studies targeted at examining the main assumptions of the JMCD. One reason for this, as proposed by Ó Ciardha and Ward (2013), is that the JMCD can account for supportive, null, and alternative findings, rendering it difficult to generate testable hypotheses. The lack of research may also be due to the lack of specificity given to the underlying mechanisms that can influence the three forms of cognitive distortions. That is, the JMCD focuses on broader explanatory factors that affect human cognition (e.g., social, cultural, environmental) to account for offenders’ judgments, since, as Ward et al. (2006) noted, “persons, not mechanisms, make judgments” (p. 327). Thus, while the JMCD provides a very useful and multifaceted account of cognitive distortions, the lack of explanatory depth paid to the exact mechanisms makes it difficult to test the assumptions of the JMCD. Indeed, Ward et al. (2006) did concede that a “line of research should examine the mechanisms that actually generate cognitive distortions related to beliefs, values, and actions” (p. 337). We argue that it is important to outline these mechanisms in a theory of cognitive distortions.

2.5. Ward’s (2009) extended mind theory
Extended mind theory was first applied to sex offenders by Ward (2009) who stressed the importance of the processes of extended cognition in understanding the etiology of distorted beliefs. According to this conceptualization, an individual’s cognitive system is a hybrid of internal components (schemas, beliefs), and components that are external to the individual (physical and social elements). In this conceptualization, having specific cognitive structures are not sufficient for an individual to manifest cognitive distortions, as their formation only emerges in the presence of external components, such as access to specific objects (child pornography), or contact with specific social structures or culture (e.g., contact with people who approve of sexual offending). In other words, cognitive distortions are the result of the interaction of internal and external components of an individual’s cognitive system. Therefore, manifesting cognitive distortions are viewed not as a permanent feature, but may occur only in certain situations or contexts, while in others (e.g., in diagnostic or treatment settings) the tendency to exhibit these may decrease. Ó Ciardha and Ward (2013) noted that the extended mind theory requires rigorous testing, which is still the case five years on. However, Ó Ciardha and Ward (2013) also argue that the generation of testable and falsifiable hypotheses is likely to be problematic due, for example, to the theory’s proposition that cognitive distortions may not be a permanent feature.

3. The multi-mechanism theory of cognitive distortions (MMT-CD)
The existing theories offer important insights for understanding sex offenders’ cognitive distortions, including the mechanisms that underpin them. These mechanisms appear to differ in kind, even though their content may appear similar. Moreover, the differing mechanisms appear to be dependent upon their temporal occurrence (in relation to offending behavior). However, we argue that these mechanisms require further explanatory depth. Fortunately, a plethora of robust research and theory on human social cognition exists outside of the sex offender literature. Thus, furthering the theoretical understanding of sex offender cognition should involve knitting the most conceptually sound and empirically validated aspects of existing cognitive distortion theories with those related to human social cognition more generally. This will help align our understanding of cognitive distortions with assumptions, constructs, and terminology present within the contemporary literature on social cognition. In addition, it will provide new ideas for research and practice. To this end, we now turn to the development and description of our new theoretical model - the multi-mechanism theory of cognitive distortions (MMT-CD). 

3.1. Laying the theoretical foundation 
Existing theories of sex offenders’ cognitive distortions primarily focus on what many refer to as cognitive products; that is, the content that is verbalized or self-reported by an individual. The prevailing view is a linear one, whereby these cognitive products are produced by (and thus reflect) deeper cognitive structures (Ward et al., 1997). However, more recent theories (e.g., the JMCD) acknowledge that cognitive distortions may arise in the absence of such structures, being affected more by the situational context or a desired goal. We argue that adopting a dual-process perspective is a useful and theoretically sound approach to bringing together these diverging views. 

3.1.1. Adopting a dual-process perspective
Dual-process models propose that human thought is largely influenced by two broad processes (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). The first involves automatic affective responses to a stimulus (based on associative processing influenced by implicit cognition) that, by default, provides the basis for one’s attitude, belief, or intuitive decision (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). The other is a more controlled and deliberative process requiring the resources of working memory, and is influenced by explicit cognitions or other momentarily considered propositions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Thus, this process can serve to override initial automatic responses (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). This aligns with the work of Gilbert (Gilbert, 2002; Gilbert & Gill, 2000), who proposes that people initially and immediately believe their subjective experience to be a true reflection of reality, before being able to discount or ‘unbelieve’ it through effortful cognitive processing. Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) argue that, if an automatic response matches one’s conscious beliefs or other momentarily considered propositions (e.g., societal views, newly learned information), it will be accepted as valid. However, if incongruent, then the initial affective response may be rejected as a valid belief, leading to a discrepancy when the two forms of cognition are measured. 
Cognitive structures (i.e., schemas, implicit theories, thematic/associative networks) meet the definition of implicit cognition, whereas distorted surface-level cognitive products reflect explicit, conscious beliefs. Thus, applying a dual-process perspective to sex offender cognition would suggest that sex offenders can hold two beliefs; one based on cognitive associations derived largely from early learning experiences (Rudman, Phelan, & Heppen, 2007) and one based on deliberative thought (e.g., reflecting social values, learned information via treatment, or elaborated reasoning). These two beliefs will match if an offender does not reject their automatic response on the basis of a conscious belief (or other momentarily considered propositions). However, some offenders may reject an automatic response on the basis of (conscious) deliberative processing, meaning that their implicit cognition will be at odds with what they consciously think and verbalize. Thus, not every conscious belief is the product of a deeper cognitive structure, as proposed by Ward et al. (1997). As such, we argue that the term ‘cognitive product’ is a misnomer, and should be dropped from the theoretical rhetoric on sex offender cognition. 

3.1.2. The effect of motivation and visceral states 
As indicated in the JMCD, cognitive distortions can be influenced by a desired goal or a situational factor. The former implies the role of motivation. In his Precondition Model of child sexual abuse, Finkelhor (1984) proposed that individuals motivated to offend will adopt attitudes supportive of sexual abuse as a way to overcome internal inhibitions (e.g., guilt). Bartels (2016) notes that this reflects the concept of motivated cognition. Motivated cognition refers to the tendency to think in a manner that helps someone meet a particular desired goal (Kunda, 1990). As Bersoff (1999) states, motivated cognition can “allow individuals to feel committed to certain prosocial norms and values and, at the same time, free them to perform acts contrary to those norms and values” (p.29). 
Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen (1996) proposed specific motives that can affect cognition; namely, accuracy motives (desire to hold valid beliefs), defense motives (desire to hold beliefs congruent with self-definitional attitudes), and impression motives (desire to express beliefs that help achieve specific goals pertinent to particular contexts). Moreover, Chaiken et al. (1996) explained that the manner by which a motive affects cognition is influenced by the type of processing that is engaged in; namely, fast (heuristic) or slower (systematic) processing. For example, impression motives are affected by heuristic processing when social consequences are minimal and involve employing simple decision rules (e.g., “To get along, go along”). Systematic processing occurs when social consequences are high and/or heuristic processing has failed in achieving one’s desired goal. We later argue that impression motives help add further explanatory depth to post-offense cognitions. 
Also relevant here is the effect of transient visceral states, such as emotion and sexual arousal, on cognitive processing and beliefs (Loewenstein, 1996; Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006). Visceral states have been found to affect people’s decision-making and beliefs (Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2008; Peters, Västfjäll, & Gärling, 2006). That is, it can lead people to ignore the negative consequences of risky behavior, including risky sexual behavior (Skakoon-Sparling, Cramer, & Shuper, 2016), in order to experience immediate gratification. Drawing upon this body of research can partially account for an individual’s biased thinking in the moments that precede a sexual offense; something that has been missing from most theories on sex offenders’ distortions. 

3.2. Mechanisms of cognitive distortions
In this section, we propose three mechanisms that underpin cognitive distortions. While these mechanisms are largely governed by differing cognitive processes, another key differentiating feature is the context-specific effect they have on an individual’s thinking and behavior (i.e., both before and after having offended). Mechanism 1 accounts for cognitive distortions that are formed long before an offense is committed. Here, cognition has a distal effect on sex offending behavior, in that, it influences one’s lifestyle and life-course in a way that ultimately brings them into a situation or state of mind that increases the risk of offending. Mechanism II refers to cognitions that arise just before (or in the led up to) an offense, whereby the motivation for abuse precedes the formation of distorted cognitions. Here, cognition serves to permit an individual to engage in sexual offending behavior. Finally, Mechanism III addresses the cognitions that arise after an offense has been committed. Here, distorted cognition either reflects the stability of implicit cognition or arises as a result of the motivation to avoid the adverse consequences of the immediate social environment. Below, we outline each mechanism in detail, in terms of its function, the way it creates particular distortions, and the role the mechanism plays in the etiology of sexual offending behavior. This is also summarized in Figure 1.

Insert Figure 1 here

3.1. Mechanism I: Distal influences
The first mechanism for how cognitive distortions arise is based upon theoretical assumptions about implicit cognition present within sex offender theories (Mann & Beech, 2003; Ward, 2000; Ward et al., 2006) and social cognition more generally (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). That is, we propose that Mechanism I is governed by offense-supportive mental associations and representations (i.e., implicit cognition). Implicit cognition is thought to initially arise from early childhood experiences (Rudman et al., 2007). It has been repeatedly shown that sex offenders often report adverse childhood experiences (Bogaerts, Vanheule, & Declercq, 2005; Connolly & Woollons, 2008; Levenson, Willis, & Prescott, 2014; McCormak, Hudson, & Ward, 2002; Simons, Wurtele, & Durkham, 2008; Stirpe, Abracen, Stermac, & Wilson, 2006). Thus, with respect to sex offenders’ implicit cognition, we argue that they primarily arise from these negative childhood experiences (e.g., rejection, neglect, abuse, and loss). Cuadra, Jaffe, Thomas, and DiLillo (2014) found that childhood sexual abuse was positively correlated with non-sexual cognitive distortions (i.e., general, proactive, and reactive criminal thinking styles), as well as with sexual offending behavior. Also, Marziano et al. (2006) found that, compared to non-abused SOCs (n = 11), the interview transcripts of SOCs reporting childhood sexual abuse (n = 11) contained a greater proportion of coded units classified as Dangerous World endorsement. This tentatively suggests that a belief in the world being a hostile place may be influenced by early sexual abuse. In a case study using EMDR therapy with a sex offender, ten Hoor (2013) noted that the client’s distorted belief that “adults can’t be trusted” was linked to his childhood victimization. Moreover, treating this early trauma led to a resolve in his cognitive distortions. 
One of the key evolutionary changes that emerged in the evolution of mammals has been the development of the neurobiological systems underpinning attachment, leading to the general care-giving of infants (Gilbert & Proctor, 2006). An individual’s attachment style, or ‘connectedness with others’ (Chapple, 2003), can be seen as a set of enduring characteristics for making sense of one’s life experiences and interactions with others (Young, Klosko, & Wesharr, 2003). Secure attachments give rise to internal working models of others as safe, helpful, and supportive (Baldwin, 2005), while an insecure attachment style causes the individual to become highly socially ranked, and focused on the power of others to control or reject them (Gilbert, 2005). Grady, Levenson, and Bolder (2017) argue that childhood trauma leads to insecure attachment styles that, in turn, can influence sexual offending behavior. Indeed, Ward, Hudson, and Marshall (1996) claimed that difficulties related to insecure attachment styles may, in part, underpin various types of sexual offenses. For example, they found that preoccupied and fearful attachment styles were associated with SOCs, while rapists tended to have a dismissive style.
There is some evidence demonstrating a relationship between attachment style and cognitive distortion. Mason, Platts, and Tyson (2005) found that, in a UK clinical population, fearful attachment style was most associated with early maladaptive schemas, followed by a preoccupied attachment style. Moreover, Wood and Riggs (2009) report that SOCs with a preoccupied or fearful attachment style reported more cognitive distortions (about the legitimacy of adult-child sexual interactions) than those with a secure or dismissive attachment style. 
Once the content of implicit cognition is formed, it can lead to a specific way of perceiving the world via associative processing (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). While implicit cognition is stable, its activation and subsequent associative processing is dependent upon the situation. As Gawronski and Bodenhausen (in press) state, implicit bias is “a reflection of the person within a given situation” (p. 5). Thus, the activation of cognitive distortions will be determined by a person-by-situation interaction, whereby the context of incoming information interacts with an individual’s cognitive structure. For example, Women as sex objects may be activated in the context of a nightclub, leading to the biased associative processing of a woman’s behavior as indicating sexual intent. However, when interacting with a woman of higher status in the context of the workplace, this IT may not be activated. Instead, the Women are Dangerous IT may be activated, causing the women’s behavior to now be interpreted as malicious. 
This person-by-situation biased processing may influence one’s decisions and motivations, such that their life-course ultimately leads them to being in a situation where the risk of committing a sexual offense is high. As Shermer (2011) notes, people tend adopt a “belief-dependent realism” (p.5), whereby once a belief is formed, information consistent with the belief is attended to and sought out (i.e., the “confirmation bias”). In a forensic context, these beliefs can lead to what Ward (2017) refers to as ‘causal models’, which dynamically influence the interpretation of “aspects of persons and environments in which people are currently situated” (p. 26). For example, the activation of the Women are dangerous IT and the resulting hostile cognitions may make a man wary and untrusting of women. In turn, he may decide to avoid relationships and only engage in promiscuous behavior (leading to further activation of the Women as sex objects IT), or he may decide to be excessively dominant in relationships in order to feel control over women. He may even come to hold a positive evaluative attitude towards rape (Hermann et al., 2016). In short, the individual may develop a rape proclivity and, in certain contexts, go on to commit an act of rape. 
However, unlike prior cognitive distortion theories, the above example does not describe the whole story nor an inevitable route to offending behavior. Based on the dual-process perspective within the MMT-CD, another individual with the same Women are dangerous IT may, in certain contexts, associatively process women’s behavior in a similar biased manner. However, he may hold a conscious belief that rejects this biased interpretation. Thus, if he has the capacity for effortful cognitive processing, he can come to override his automatic response (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). This signifies the importance of human agency and would suggest that (and, in part, explain why) some men who hold implicit rape-related cognitions do not go on to sexually offend. Also, some men may not harbor rape-supportive implicit cognition, but adopt conscious beliefs that are supportive of rape (given how common such views are in the general population, particularly among males; Suarez & Gadalla, 2010). Future research needs to investigate what effect these discrepancies between implicit and explicit beliefs have on sexually abusive behavior. 
On a similar point, it has recently become acknowledged that there are pedophilic men within the general community who do not (and do not want to) offend against children (Cantor & McPhail, 2016). Recent research suggests that some of these non-offending pedophiles hold conscious beliefs that align with “the rules of current society against having sex with children” (Houtepen, Sijtsema, & Bogaerts, 2016, p. 59). They also report fewer child abuse-related cognitive distortions (on a self-report questionnaire) compared to SOCs (Jahnke, Schmidt, Geradt, & Hoyer, 2015). Although unknown at present, it is possible that non-offending pedophiles hold offense-supportive implicit cognitions (as a result of their pedophilic sexual interest; Ó Ciardha, 2011), which are overridden by their offense-opposing conscious beliefs. This is a hypothesis worthy of empirical testing. In addition, a number of non-offending pedophiles are part of an online support group (e.g., VirPed) and read academic literature on pedophilia. This kind of activity may shape their implicit cognition to be less offense-supportive (and thus match their conscious beliefs). Indeed, research shows that people who are decided about a particular viewpoint (e.g., that sex with child abuse is wrong) will selectively expose themselves to information that supports their conscious beliefs (e.g., academic literature on pedophilia), which, in turn, shifts their implicit associations to be in line with their pre-existing conscious beliefs (Galdi, Gawronski, Arcuri, & Friese, 2012). This requires direct testing in future research. 
In summary, Mechanism I involves an interplay between distorted implicit cognition (that are formed primarily from adverse early experiences) and explicit, conscious beliefs. Should one’s conscious beliefs match their distorted implicit cognition, we argue it will serve as a distal influence (or ‘background factor’; Ward, Louden, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995) on their risk of offending. However, if one’s conscious beliefs are incongruent with their implicit cognition (e.g., if they reflect societal norms), it will reduce the likelihood of following an offense pathway.  

3. 2. Mechanism II: Proximal influences
Mechanism II starts to operate when an individual is in a more immediate context to sexually offend. That is, when they have developed a motivation to offend, whether that be situationally (e.g., in response to a woman deciding not to engage in sexual activity after returning to a date’s home) or premeditatedly (e.g., actively grooming a child for sexual abuse), or when they are disinhibited (e.g., due to intense sexual arousal). In these contexts, Mechanism II can extend from Mechanism I. That is, distorted associative processing may not only guide one’s life-course (see above) but also go on to influence one’s decision-making and behavior within the proximal context of an offense. For example, an individual who believes that women enjoy sex even if forced upon them (which is not rejected on the basis of an opposing conscious belief), may decide to engage in this manner on a date, leading to a sexual offense being committed. 
However, Mechanism II also accounts for the processes that may occur in individuals who do not hold distorted beliefs (either implicitly or explicitly). All human beings strive to attain a number of common human needs or goals (e.g., the need for emotional closeness, pleasure; Ward & Stewart, 2003). As outlined in the JMCD, some individuals go about fulfilling these needs by engaging in offending behavior; a clear socially unacceptable act. Thus, they engage in ‘sloppy thinking’, resulting in seemingly distorted cognitions. These situational cognitive distortions are produced to account for the fact that sexual offending conflicts with the individual’s beliefs, values, or society’s norms. In other words, the motivation is egodystonic and the future offender needs to justify it to himself. Therefore, one function of Mechanism II is the creation of situational distortions that justify committing an offense, reducing the uncomfortable feeling that arises when one’s goal and belief conflict. The idea that future offenders engage in pre-offense justifications has been mentioned in the existing literature. For example, Hall and Hirschman's (1992) argue that cognitive distortions are used by offenders to justify a future offense. More recently, Kettleborough and Merdian (2017) used the term ‘permission-giving thoughts’ to refer to “statements that may increase the individual’s risk of translating internal motivation into offending behaviour” (p.19).
We propose that the ‘goal acquisition-variant’ of Mechanism II is governed by motivated cognition or reasoning (Kunda, 1990). In her seminal paper, Kunda (1990) noted that directional goals “affect people's attitudes, beliefs, and inferential strategies” (p. 493). She proposed that motivated individuals attempt to arrive at a justified conclusion in a manner they deem rational. Entering an “illusion of objectivity”, the person searches their memory for alternate beliefs and rules that support their desired goal/conclusion (which is ultimately a biased endeavor). For example, a man may find himself wanting to sexually abuse a child, which stands in the face of his belief that sex with children is wrong. However, he searches his memory for evidence to justify the goal and adopts the view that children are interested in having sex (perhaps based on his own childhood memory of being interested in sex). When verbalized to a clinician, this could be mistakenly interpreted as a ‘Children as sexual beings’ IT. Similarly, another individual may search his memory and adopt the view common myth that women play hard to get and would actually enjoy being ‘taken’ (which could be interpreted as a Women as sex objects IT by others). 
	We also propose that Mechanism II has a ‘visceral effect-variant’. This is an aspect often neglected in theories of sex offender cognition. Specifically, we propose that the transient visceral states of sexual arousal and emotion (e.g., anger) play a core role in overriding one’s decision-making processes, which can facilitate offending behavior. For example, sexually aroused males are more likely to agree to engage in sexually coercive behavior with a female (Loewenstein, Nagin, & Paternoster, 1997), which is mediated by an over-perception of sexual intent in the female (Bouffard & Miller, 2014). Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) also found that sexually aroused males reported being able to imagine themselves attracted to a 12-year old girl, relative to non-aroused males. Here, sexual arousal not only shifts one’s attention towards sexual cues (Nordgren & Chou, 2011) but also shifts their motivational state to one focused on immediate gratification. This can lead to making decisions (e.g., deciding to force sex on a woman) that are counter to beliefs they hold (e.g., “Non-consensual sex is wrong”). When an offender verbalizes the cognitions they experienced during the aroused state, they are likely to be interpreted as reflecting a stable rape-supportive belief. 
	Bartels (2016) notes that some theories of sexual offending refer to the effect of ‘integral emotions’ – that is, emotions that exert an immediate effect (Bodenhausen, 1993). For example, Hall and Hirschman (1991) implicitly refer to the effect of integral emotions in cases of rape, whereby anger is experienced in response to being rejected by a female, leading to sexual aggression. These emotions are likely to lead to what Frijda, Mesquita, Sonnemans, and van Goozen (1991) refer to as “temporary belief changes” (p. 197). As Frijda et al. (1991) state, these emotion-induced temporary beliefs provide the reason for doing and saying things one regrets, and often dissipate once the felt emotion is over. Thus, in the example above, the male’s experience of anger may have led to the temporary belief that women are deceitful in their motives. This temporary belief may have a proximal effect, in that, it increases his likelihood of forcing sex on the women. Again, when articulated later in a ‘cold state’, the temporary belief may be heard as being a stable distorted belief.
	In summary, Mechanism II primarily accounts for how, in the absence of more stable distorted cognitions, directional goals and visceral factors can affect one’s cognitive processing (i.e., interpretation, motivation, decision-making, temporary beliefs) in a manner that increases the risk of sexually offending.    

3. 3. Mechanism III: Post-offense influences 
Mechanism III starts operating after the offense is committed. The main function of these distortions created at this point is to cope with the negative reactions from the offender’s post-offense environment. These reactions may be real or only anticipated by the offender. An additional reason is the offender’s own negative reactions and related feelings, especially a sense of guilt. In these circumstances, the offender engage in minimization and denial, which reduce negative feelings and help defend himself against other people’s negative reaction. Thus, Mechanism III cognitions serve to influence how an individual is perceived and treated by others in light of having sexually offended (e.g., by convincing a third party that they are not responsible or an intrinsically bad person). 
We propose that offense-specific denial resulting from Mechanism III is a distinct construct from general distorted beliefs resulting from Mechanism I. Indeed, Blumenthal, Gudjonsson, and Burns (1999) argued that enduring, situationally non-specific beliefs are distinct from offence-specific cognitions, such as blame attributions and denial; a view supported by Nunes and Jung (2013). Thus, general post-offense distorted cognitions are likely a reflection of more stable implicit or explicit beliefs (governed by Mechanism I), while offense-specific distortions (arising from Mechanism III) reflect context-driven justifications. 
The minimization  function of Mechanism III has been noted by Abel’s et al. (1989) to be driven by a desire to reduce cognitive dissonance, while the JMCD (Ward et al. 2006) refers to social processes (e.g., managing others’ perception). Others have focused on the effect that self-serving biases can have on attributional processes (Friestad, 2012; Maruna & Mann, 2006). That is, people tend to make internal attributions for successes and external attributions for failures as a way to maintain self-esteem (Zuckerman, 1979). Thus, an individual may view their offending behavior as a failure (e.g., for having lost control or broken the law). As such, they may be more inclined to think up an external explanation for their offending (“I did it because I was drunk”), rather than internal attributions that may reduce their self-esteem (“I did it because I wanted to”). This excuse-making will be amplified by the context; that is, the offender usually perceives the assessment, and especially the treatment, as a part of the punishment. On one hand, Maruna and Mann (2006) note that such an attribution style is beneficial and adaptive. On the other hand, increased excuse-making can undermine people’s sense of responsibility, dedication, and persistence (Schlenker, Pontari, & Christopher, 2001), and therefore has a negative impact on adaptation. 
Given the role of context, we argue that the motivated reasoning work of Chaiken et al. (1996) also accounts for how Mechanism III operates. Specifically, offenders are likely to be impression-motived (i.e., have a desire to express beliefs that aid in achieving a specific goal related to the particular context). This will lead offenders to adopt (or at least verbalize) beliefs that help minimize their accountability for an offense. Moreover, if cognitive resources are low (e.g., due to stress), the offender may adopt a less effortful route to justifying their behavior in more categorical terms via heuristic processing (e.g., “I didn’t do what she said”). However, given the high social consequences they face, offenders’ motivated reasoning will more likely be governed by a more effortful (systematic) form of information processing (Chaiken et al.. 1996). That is, they will attempt to seem more confident and reliable in what they say (e.g., “The women enjoyed it, as she did not fight back”). These particular verbalizations will serve a context-specific function (i.e., minimization, saving face). Cognitive distortions related to Mechanism III have not yet been included in multifactorial theories of sexual offending. This is probably because they arise after an offense, while most multifactor theories exclusively focus on cognitive factors that occur before an offense.

3.4. Relationship between mechanisms
At this point, the relation between the mechanisms should be highlighted. First, the content of cognitive distortions emerging from different mechanisms do not differ significantly. Therefore, when verbalized or self-reported, they may appear to be identical. For example, the phrase “She enjoyed it, as she did not fight back” articulated post-offense by a rapist could either be a context-specific distortion arising from Mechanism III or an accurate telling of what the individual biasedly perceived at the time of the offence (based on Mechanism I). Second, more than one mechanism may be in operation (e.g., Mechanism I may contribute to a motivation that then influences the operation of Mechanism II). Third, as Ward et al. (2006) suggested, processes that generate distortions after an offense (Mechanism III) may lead to the formation of stable (implicit and/or explicit) distorted beliefs, which then feedback and influence Mechanism I (see Figure 1). Under these conditions, Mechanism III has the potential to influence further offenses. For example, an offender who consistently rationalizes that he abused a child because the child willingly invited it, may eventually start to believe that children (in general) are sexual beings. In turn, he may come to actually view a child’s innocuous behavior as being flirtatious (via Mechanism I), leading to a reoffense. 

4. Applying the MMT-CD to the etiology of sex offending 
	Figure 1 above summarizes how the mechanisms proposed by the MMT-CD can influence the etiology (and maintenance) of sexual offending. In the following section, we discuss this in more detail by incorporating the MMT-CD into an existing multifactor theory – the Integrated Theory of Sexual Offending (Ward & Beech, 2006).

Insert Figure 2 here

Figure 2 provides a schematic outline of the ITSO, which was developed by combining the most robust aspects of previous multifactor sex offender theories. The ITSO outlines three sets of interacting factors; namely, biological factors (genetic inheritance and brain development); ecological niche factors (social, cultural and personal circumstances, divided into distal and proximal niches); and neuropsychological factors (identified as three interlocking neuropsychological functions). The various interaction of these three factors leads to the creation of one or more clinical symptoms (state or ‘dynamic’ risk factors), which include: emotional problems, social difficulties, cognitive distortions, and deviant sexual interest. These symptoms eventually result in offending behavior. Furthermore, committing an offense has an impact on the offender’s ecological niche, as well as his psychological functioning. In turn, this can lead to an increased severity of the symptoms, increasing the risk of reoffending. A strength of the ITSO is that it provides a framework for explaining the different pathways to offending. Due to this advantage, the three mechanisms of the MMT-CD may be incorporated into the ITSO, helping to elucidate how cognitive distortions may influence sexual offending (see Figure 3). 

Insert Figure 3 here

Mechanism I. Adverse developmental experiences are a part of the distal ecological niche. These experiences, mediated through interlocking neuropsychological functions, lead to the formation of implicit and explicit cognition underlying cognitive distortions. It is also possible that some individuals are biologically (genetically and by brain development) predisposed to forming such associative structures. The cognitive distortions are clinical symptoms resulting from faulty interpretations of social stimuli (in specific contexts) that are not rejected by explicit beliefs. Within the proximal niche, these interpretations may directly influence an offence (e.g., by misperceiving sexual cues), as well as provide a source of motivation. Also, the effects of Mechanism I will lead individuals to engage in behaviors throughout life that shape their distal and proximal ecological niche in a way that increases the probability of sexually offending. For example, future SOCs who believe that adults are too dangerous to achieve intimacy with may arrange their life circumstance in a way that allows them to spend more time with children (e.g., choose a job working with children).
Mechanism II. The ‘visceral effect-variant’ of Mechanism II will operate within the proximal niche due to the effect of other clinical symptoms. This includes ‘temporary belief changes’ caused by emotion dysregulation and interpersonal conflict, as well as the disinhibitory effects of deviant sexual arousal. The ‘goal acquisition-variant’ operates within the proximal niche when a desired goal (influenced by the motivation-emotion system) promotes motivated cognition, enabling internal inhibitions for offending to be overcome. Also, if the distortions of Mechanism II are frequently defended post-offence, they may strengthen existing distorted implicit or explicit beliefs (via belief polarization), or lead to the formation of stable implicit/explicit beliefs. In the latter case, these new beliefs may lead to risk-related changes to the proximal ecological niche, maintaining offending behavior.
Mechanism III. After an offense has been committed, the individual may draw upon external attributions for his offending to reduce the negative affect caused by his offending behavior. Certain attributions such as “I was in the wrong place at the wrong time” or “It was because she rejected me” may lead to an individual to change his proximal niche. For example, he may revert to a more isolated life, losing the protective effects offered by friends and social support. As a result, other clinical symptoms (causal risk factors), such as emotional dysregulation and social difficulties, may worsen, increasing the risk of offending again. Also, others (e.g., in treatment, prison) may perceive the offender’s justifications as an indicator of not taking responsibility for his actions and faces that strengthens their negative reaction. As a consequence, he may engage in impression-motivated reasoning, searching for relevant beliefs conducive to the context at hand. These are likely to be externally-attributed statements about the offense that reduce negative feelings in the offender and (at face value) paint a more favorable impression of the offender. However, the repeated articulation of these minimizing statements may inadvertently create (or reinforce existing) implicit and/or explicit beliefs. In turn, Mechanism I may come to operate in the future, facilitating the commission of a new offence. 

5. Research implications
A good theoretical account should be able to generate testable hypotheses. Indeed, we feel that the MMT-CD offers many lines of empirical inquiry for future researchers. Below we offer some examples. With regards to Mechanism I, this can involve using separate measures that target implicit cognition (e.g., indirect measures) and explicit cognition (e.g., questionnaires). This has been done with SOCs (Keown et al., 2010) with the view that the two measures will correlate, given that cognitive products (assessed by questionnaires) are typically viewed as being the result of deeper cognitive structures (assessed indirectly) . However, Keown et al. (2010) found no convergence, leading to concerns about the validity of the indirect measure as well as the concept of cognitive distortions. However, the MMT-CD proposes that a discrepancy between such measures may highlight that an offender’s automatic response is being overridden by their explicit (conscious) beliefs. This indicates that researchers should treat the two as separate and examine them (and their effects) individually. A nice example of this approach was demonstrated by Hermann and Nunes (2016). After finding that evaluative attitudes towards rape (“e.g., rape is good”) are distinct from distorted beliefs about rape (Nunes, Hermann, White, Petterson, & Bumby, 2016), Hermann and Nunes (2016) went on to show that implicit and explicit positive evaluations of rape independently predicted future sexual aggression. 
Researchers should also look to using measures that are able to detect the influence of both implicit/associative and explicit processes. One example is mousetracking (Freeman & Ambady, 2010), which assesses real-time cognitive processing in response to various stimuli, which offers an insight into the interplay between automatic responses and more explicit processing. Also, some indirect measures that are thought to only assess ‘raw’ cognitive associations (such as the Implicit Association Test) have been found to be influenced by both associative and explicit processes. Thus, techniques that can disentangle these processes - such as the Quad Model (Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005) - may be a useful avenue for researchers. Finally, Mechanism I is argued to primarily have a distal etiological influence on a sexual offence. Thus, researchers should explore what effect distorted cognition has on other areas of individuals’ (pre-offense) life (e.g., relationships, career choice, routine activities), especially given that some of their implicit beliefs relate to the world and themselves (not just categories associated with offending behavior). 
With regards to Mechanism II, researchers could explore the relationship between certain motivational goals and distorted beliefs. This could involve assessing existing goals or manipulating a goal and examining if it influences distorted beliefs. Also, researchers should explore whether visceral factors (e.g., sexual arousal, negative integral emotions) influences ‘temporary beliefs’ related to sexual offending behavior, and whether there is a discrepancy between what is thought/believed during a ‘hot state’ and a ‘cold state’. Studies examining these processes implicated in Mechanism II will provide direct support for the proposition that goals and sexual arousal/emotion have an effect of offense-related cognition, thereby, distinguishing situational cognitions from (the more focused on) stable beliefs. On a more general level, asking offenders about their cognitions just prior (and during) an offense, in conjunction with assessing their general distorted beliefs, will enable researchers to examine the difference (and potential interplay) between cognitions arising from Mechanism I and II.
With regards to Mechanism III, researchers should focus on offenders’ perceptions about a specific offence, as denial/minimizations about specific offences are distinct from general distorted cognitions (Nunes & Jung, 2013). To test the former, researchers should use measures such as the Sex Offender Acceptance of Responsibility Scales (Peacock, 2000), which assesses perceptions of specific offence/s (e.g., “The victim(s) of my sexual offending recovered quickly”). Similarly, measures of blame attribution may be useful as they help determine whether offenders hold specific external or internal reasons for their offending. Second, studies designed to prime different motives (e.g., impression-motives vs. accuracy-motives) before completing one of the measures mentioned above will provide a test of our proposition that impression-motives affects Mechanism III distortions (see Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996; Study 2). Third, examining whether repeated articulation of offence-specific distortions leads to greater implicit and explicit general cognitions will provide a test of whether Mechanism III distortions can feedback and create new cognitions related to Mechanism I.  

6. Practical implications
Based on the assumptions of the MMT-CD, treatment should not be targeted at particular distortions (i.e., those influenced by Mechanism III). Although such distortions may indirectly lead to the maintenance of offending, directly targeting them in treatment may lead to their intensification. Indeed, when an individual is faced with the opposing belief of someone else, they are likely to endorse their beliefs more strongly; a concept termed ‘belief polarization’ (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). As Marshall et al. (2011) observed, leaving Mechanism III distortions non-confronted often results in a decrease in their intensity. Moreover, due to the relation between Mechanism III and adaptive excuse-making process (Maruna & Mann, 2006), challenging such distortions may have an adverse effect on a participant’s functioning. In light of this, distortions resulting from Mechanisms I and II should be targeted in treatment as they impose a distal and proximal etiological influence on offending behavior, respectively. The focus on Mechanism I distortions is consistent with previous assertions that “offense-supportive attitudes” (Maruna & Mann, 2006), etiological cognitions (Ó Ciardha, & Gannon, 2011), and distorted schemas (Beech et al., 2013) should be targeted in treatment. This is also consistent with the meta-analytic results of Helmus, Hanson, Babchishin and Mann (2013), who found that general beliefs supportive of sexual offending predicted recidivism.
Based on the MMT-CD, clinicians should specifically target the underlying cognitive (associative or conscious) processing, as well as the motivational and situational factors affecting cognitive processes (i.e., maladaptive goals, sexual arousal, regulation of emotion). Lai and Banaji (in press) propose that the effects of biased implicit cognition can be addressed by: (1) redesigning the situation that activate implicit cognition; (2) changing the content of implicit cognition; and (3) providing conscious strategies for self-regulating the effects of implicit cognition. Thus, aiding offenders to engineer environments (ecological niches) that afford the activation of adaptive cognitions and impede the activation of distorted cognitions will be of importance (e.g., a job with socially supportive adult peers will impede the activation of child-related distortions and promote cognitions that counter the view that adults are dangerous/mistrustful). Employing strategies that can change implicit cognition will add further benefit (e.g., schema therapy). In addition, there are many brief methods aimed at reducing implicit biases. One effective procedure is the repeated experience of counter-stereotypical associations (Forscher et al., 2016; Lai et al., 2014). In the present context, this could involve repeatedly pairing “innocent” with “children” in SOCs, such that the newly learned association will compete with the activation of the existing category schema that children are “sexual”. Finally, providing strategies that help regulate implicit biases will be of great value. As the MMT-CD suggests, restructuring the content of distorted explicit cognitions should lead distorted automatic responses (resulting from implicit cognition) to be overridden, as the latter would be appraised as invalid. However, people often seek to confirm their initial beliefs and overriding them requires much mental effort. Thus, this needs to be factored in. Also, research suggests that instructing participants to consciously use counter-stereotypical ‘intention implementations’ in response to stimuli is effective at decreasing the effects of implicit biases (Lai et al., 2014; Stewart & Payne, 2008). Applying this work to distorted cognitions would involve training offenders to implement “I definitely want to respond to children by thinking innocent” or ““I definitely want to respond to women by thinking trustful”. 
Since the strategies outlined above each help reduce the effects of implicit biases, finding a way to incorporate them in therapy will likely provide the greatest success. Furthermore, rather than viewing these procedures as isolated tools for changing implicit cognition, clinicians should consider delivering them via a more compassionate therapeutic process. That is, creating a safe environment within which self-discovery and self-reflection are encouraged through the use of life maps that enable the identification of ‘Old Me’ thinking patterns (Walton, Ramsey, Cunningham, & Henfrey, 2017). This safe environment will discourage self-serving Mechanism III distortions from surfacing, allowing clinicians to identify participants’ more stable thinking patterns, life decisions, and related behaviors. 
Through this therapeutic process, the aforementioned procedures for changing implicit cognition can be introduced as a means of providing ‘personal rules’ that help promote a ‘New Me’ way of thinking (Walton et al., 2017). The ‘New Me’ thinking patterns can be then be strengthened by helping clients develop a pro-social identity (Friestad, 2012; Walton et al. 2017); that is, helping individuals to identity values and goals that promote ‘healthy thinking’ and prosocial behavior. The promotion of prosocial goals here will also help reduce the proximal effect of the ‘goal acquisition-variant’ of Mechanism II. In addition, within the safe environment, clinicians could incorporate emotional awareness work (in relation to emotional and sexual arousal) to enable individuals to more effectively identify bodily sensations and their effect on momentary thinking patterns (Waldom et al., 2017). This could help address the ‘visceral effect-variant’ of Mechanism II. In summary, the above clinical suggestions derived from the MMT-CD align with results from social-cognitive research and recent developments in forensic-related rehabilitation. As such, researchers are encouraged to empirically test these propositions using samples of individuals convicted of sex offences.

7. Summary
In this paper, we have described the MMT-CD; an updated theoretical account of cognitive distortions related to the commission and maintenance of sexual offending in males. The MMT-CD integrates previous cognitive distortion theories and research, as well as recent research and theory from the general field of social cognition. That is, extending the idea that there are three types of cognitive distortions, as proposed in the JMCD (Ward et al., 2006), we draw upon dual-process perspectives, motivated cognition, and the myopic effect of visceral factors to provide a detailed explanation of the psychological mechanisms that give rise to the different distortions. These three distortion types reflect: (1) an interplay between implicit and explicit cognitive processing, which primarily has a distal influence on offending behavior (Mechanism I); (2) the momentary influence of goals and visceral states on cognitive processing, which proximally influences offending behavior; and (3) the contextual constraints of post-offense environments that impose a self-serving cognitive process. The main reason for controversies over the term ‘cognitive distortions’ is the fact that the term is used to label several different phenomena. However, based on the MMT-CD, researchers and clinicians could use the temporal occurrence of the underlying mechanisms (in relation to an offense) to differentiate the three types of distortions. Namely, distal distortions, proximal (goal-driven or arousal-driven) distortions, and post-offense distortions. 
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